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I. INTRODUCTION
Erotic dancers Gayle Sutro, Carla Johnson, and Darlene Miller can
no longer dance nude in Indiana. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.1 the
United States Supreme Court held that Indiana's prohibition of nude
dancing did not violate the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.2 The Court's holding ended years of controversy and debate
over Indiana's public indecency statute.3
In 1979, in State v. Baysinger, the Indiana Supreme Court held
that Indiana's public indecency statute could be used to prohibit nude
dancing.4 The court stated that the statute could not prohibit some
larger forms of expression involving the communication of ideas. The
court concluded, however, that nude dancing was mere conduct without
,the expression of ideas.6 Since Baysinger the Indiana Court of Appeals
has struggled with the constitutional issues surrounding nude dancing.7
In 1990 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considered the application of the Indiana public indecency statute to
nude dancing in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend.' The Miller deci-
1. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (plurality opinion).
2. Id. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
The First Amendment applies to the states because it is incorporated in the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 n.6 (1941).
3. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1985) provides in pertinent part:
Public Indecency-Indecent exposure.
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) Engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) Appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public indecency, a class A
misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or but-
tocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a
fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a
discernibly turgid state.
Id.
4. 397 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1979), appeal dismissed sub nom. Clark v. Indiana, 446 U.S. 931
(1980), and Dove v. Indiana, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
5. Id. at 587.
6. Id. The court stated that "the activity involved is appearing nude or dancing in the nude
in bars and is conduct .... This activity is conduct, not speech, and as such, this claim does not
rise to the level of a First Amendment claim." Id.
7. See Erhardt v. State, 463 N.E.2d 1121 (Ind. Ct. App.) (holding that a dance contestant did
not violate Indiana's public indecency statute when she danced nude), rev'd, 468 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.
1984); Adims v. State, 461 N.E.2d 740 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that nude dancing in an adult
bookstore violated Indiana's public indecency statute).
8. 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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sion contained six separate opinions, revealing a court sharply divided
on the basis of legal analysis as well as personal opinions and cultural
views.9 The majority held that nonobscene nude dancing, performed as
entertainment, is expression entitled to limited First Amendment pro-
tection.' 0 The majority suggested that the Indiana legislature could reg-
ulate nude dancing for reasons unrelated to the suppression of free
expression." The court, however, found that the public indecency stat-
ute's total ban on this protected activity was unconstitutional."
The United States Supreme Court, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc.,"3 reversed the Seventh Circuit.14 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the
plurality opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist conceded that nude dancing is expressive conduct that
falls within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.' 5 Nonethe-
less, he determined that the Indiana statute's prohibition of nude danc-
ing was clearly within the State's constitutional power.' 6 In reaching
this decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist applied the four-part test an-
nounced in United States v. O'Brien17 and concluded that Indiana's
substantial governmental interest in promoting morality and protecting
societal order justified the application of the statute to this expressive
activity. 8 He reasoned that the public indecency statute was unrelated
to the suppression of free expression and only incidentally infringed
upon the protected activity at issue.'
Justices Souter and Scalia filed separate concurrences. Justice Sou-
ter wrote separately to identify additional justifications for the stat-
ute.20 Justice Souter found that the harmful secondary effects of nude
dancing justified a broad application of the public indecency statute."'
Justice Scalia also wrote separately because he viewed the statute as
regulating conduct, not expression.22 Thus, he believed the case did not
9. Id. See Walker v. City of Kansas City, 919 F.2d 1339, 1341 (8th Cir. 1990). See also infra
notes 94-119 and accompanying text.
10. 904 F.2d at 1085.
11. Id. at 1088.
12. Id. at 1089.
13. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (plurality).
14. Id. at 2463.
15. Id. at 2460.
16. Id. at 2460-63.
17. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For a more detailed discussion of the O'Brien test, see infra notes
139-41 and accompanying text.
18. 111 S. Ct. at 2462-63.
19. Id. at 2463.
20. Id. at 2468-69 (Souter, J., concurring).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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implicate First Amendment analysis.2"
Justice White, with whom Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens joined in dissent, agreed with the plurality and Justice Souter that
the nude dancing in this case was expressive conduct deserving First
Amendment protection.2 4 Justice White dissented because the Indiana
statute, as applied to nude dancing, targeted the erotic message com-
municated by the expressive activity.25 As a content-specific regulation,
the statute demanded more exacting scrutiny than the plurality applied
through the O'Brien test.26 Justice White concluded that the State's in-
terests in prohibiting nude dancing under this higher standard could
not justify the statute's total ban on this constitutionally protected
activity.2
Since as early as 193128 the Supreme Court has attempted to estab-
lish the boundaries of First Amendment protection for expressive con-
duct 29 The Court, however, has reached varying conclusions concerning
a wide range of activities.2 The Barnes case represents the latest devel-
opment in the continuing struggle to define the outer limits of the First
Amendment.
Part II of this Recent Development examines the history of the
nude dancing issue in the United States Supreme Court. Part III charts
the evolution of Barnes as the backdrop for the Supreme Court's first
conclusive ruling on the nude dancing issue. Part IV discusses the plu-
rality's reasoning in Barnes for upholding Indiana's prohibition of nude
dancing, as well as the concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Souter
and the dissenting opinion of Justice White. Part V recognizes two sig-
nificant flaws in the Barnes Court's analysis. First, the Court wrongly
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2471 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2474.
26. Id. at 2475.
27. Id. at 2475-76.
28. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), the Court held that a California statute
prohibiting public display of "any flag, badge, banner, or device. . . as a sign, symbol or emblem
of organized opposition to government" was an impermissible infringement of freedom of speech.
Id. at 361.
29. Any conduct may be expressive. See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text. The
Court, therefore, has struggled to determine what conduct under what circumstances is sufficiently
expressive to merit First Amendment protection. See infra note 30. See also Jeffrey A. Been, Er-
hardt v. State: Nude Dancing Stripped of First Amendment Protection, 19 IND. L. REV. 1 (1986).
30. The Court has reached conclusions concerning: movies, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952); theater, Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); rock music, Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); silent picketing, Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); the wearing of black armbands, Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); sleeping in a public park, Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); and flag burning, Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
240 [Vol. 45:237
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concluded that Indiana's statute was a general proscription of all nudity
that only incidentally infringed on the erotic message of nude dancing.
The Court, thus, erred in applying the less vigorous scrutiny of the
O'Brien test to Indiana's prohibition of nude dancing. Second, assum-
ing arguendo that the Court was correct in applying the O'Brien test,
the State's interest in regulating public nudity did not justify the com-
plete prohibition of this protected activity. Part VI suggests that the
Court's faulty analysis in Barnes underscored its reluctance to accept
nude dancing as a legitimate form of protected expression. Part VI,
therefore, explores the issue of whether nude dancing should be pro-
tected under the First Amendment. This Recent Development con-
cludes that the Barnes decision reflects the Court's assessment of the
artistic merits of nude dancing and suggests that this smokescreen ap-
proach to jurisprudence is the most significant and troublesome aspect
of the Barnes case.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: DANCING AROUND THE NUDE DANCING
QUESTION
Over the years, courts have struggled to decide whether nude danc-
ing falls within the protection of the First Amendment.31 Before Barnes
lower courts were split on this issue. Some courts took the view that
nude dancing was entitled to First Amendment protection 2 and should
not be prohibited unless obscene.33 Other courts concluded that nude
dancing was mere conduct without a communicative element and,
31. See generally Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Topless or Bottomless Dancing or Similar
Conduct as Offense, 49 A.L!R3D 1084 (1973).
32. See, e.g., Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that an
ordinance banning topless dancing in establishments where alcohol is served was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment); Mickens v. City of Kodiak, 640 P.2d 818 (Alaska 1982) (same); In re
Giannini, 446 P.2d 535 (Cal. 1968) (holding that nude dancing was protected by the First Amend-
ment unless the performance was obscene), cert. denied sub nom. California v. Giannini, 395 U.S.
910 (1969), overruled by Crownover v. Musick, 509 P.2d 497 (1973); Erhardt v. State, 463 N.E.2d
1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that a dance contestant who danced in a nonobscene manner
while wearing only a G-string was entitled to First Amendment protection and could not be con-
victed under the indecency statute), rev'd, 468 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1984); People v. Nixon, 390
N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. App. Term 1976) (holding that an ordinance with an across-the-board prohibi-
tion of any public breast exposure infringed First Amendment rights); Haines v. State, 512 P.2d
820 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (holding that nude dancing constitutes expression that, unless ob-
scene, warrants First Amendment protection). See also Koppinger v. City of Fairmont, 248
N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 1976); People v. Wehnke, 436 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Rome City Ct., Oneida County,
1981).
33. The Supreme Court established the modem test for obscenity in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973). According to the Miller Court, a work is obscene if it (1) depicts or describes sexual
conduct, (2) the sexual conduct is specifically defined by the applicable state law, (3) applying
contemporary community standards, the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in
sex, (4) the work portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and (5) taken as a whole, the
work does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. at 39.
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therefore, deserved no First Amendment protection.34 Most courts, in
deciding nude dancing cases, focused on the issue of whether the partic-
ular performance in question was obscene.35 Few cases addressed the
question of nonobscene nude dancing as expression. 6
Prior to Barnes the United States Supreme Court had grappled
with this issue, but had not determined conclusively whether nude
dancing invoked First Amendment protection.3 7 In several cases the
Court stated that some minimal First Amendment interests might be
implicated by nude dancing.38 In each case, however, the Court held
that' any potential constitutional protections were outweighed by the
State's regulatory power under the Twenty-first Amendment. 9
34. See, e.g., Starshock, Inc. v. Shusted, 370 F. Supp. 506 (D. N.J. 1974) (holding that nude
dancing to rock music fell far short of presenting the issue of "speech" sufficiently important to
outweigh the State's interest in curtailing nudity in public places and entitling dancing to First
Amendment protection), rev'd without opinion, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1978); Yauch v. State, 514
P.2d 709 (Ariz. 1973) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting nude performers did not violate the
First Amendment since nudity in restaurants and cabarets is for the obvious purpose of commer-
cial exploitation, and its elimination will not impede the exchange of ideas tending to bring about
political or social change), overruled by State v. Western, 812 P.2d 987 (Ariz. 1991); Crownover v.
Musick, 509 P.2d 497 (Cal. 1973) (holding that ordinances prohibiting nudity in designated estab-
lishments were directed at conduct and not at speech), cert. denied sub nom. Owen v. Musick, and
Reynolds v. Sacramento, 415 U.S. 931 (1974), overruled by Morris v. Municipal Court, 652 P.2d 58
(1982); Hoffman v. Carson, 250 So. 2d 891 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 981 (1971). See also
Jones v. City of Birmingham, 224 So. 2d 922 (Ala. Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011
(1970); City of Portland v. Derrington, 451 P.2d 111 (Or.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Way-
side Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 208 S.E.2d 51 (Va. 1974); City of Seattle v. Hink-
ley, 517 P.2d 592 (Wash. 1973).
These cases do not support the proposition that nude dancing is never protected by the First
Amendment. Rather, many of these cases were decided in light of the specific circumstances sur-
rounding a particular performance. Thus, only the particular activity at issue was not entitled to
First Amendment protection. See Barbre, supra note 31, at 1099.
At least one court has found humor in the notion of allowing dance First Amendment protec-
tion. An Oakland, California Superior Court judge sarcastically stated:
The high court's lesson is to teach
that dancing is a form of speech;
and terpsichorean convolution
is protected by the constitution
so bestiality's a crime
but not if done in three-four time
and jailers will have little chance
with felons who know how to dance.
See id. at 1087-88 n.4 (quoting N.Y. TImES, Apr. 6, 1972).
35. See Barbre, supra note 31, at 1109.
36. See id. at 1094.
37. See infra notes 40-72 and accompanying text; see also New York State Liquor Auth. v.
Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718-19 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which Justice Stevens stated that
"[a]lthough the Court has written several opinions implying that nude or partially nude dancing is
a form of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment, the Court has never directly
confronted the question." Id.
38. See infra notes 40-72 and accompanying text.
39. The Twenty-first Amendment rejected the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition of the
242
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The Supreme Court first addressed the nude dancing issue in Cali-
fornia v. LaRue. 0 In LaRue the Court upheld California Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control regulations that prohibited certain sexually
explicit films and live entertainment in licensed bars and nightclubs.
41
The Court agreed that at least some of the performances covered by the
California regulations were within the constitutional protection of free-
dom of speech.42 Instead of defining the appropriate level of First
Amendment protection, the Court simply side-stepped the issue and
held that the Twenty-first Amendment allowed the State to ban nude
dancing in establishments that serve liquor.43
Two years later, in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.," the Supreme Court
again implied that nude dancing was protected expression. In Doran
the owners of three topless bars sought an injunction against a North
Hampstead, New York ordinance that banned topless performances in
public places.45 The Court upheld the lower court's preliminary injunc-
manufacture, sale, or transportation of alcoholic beverages. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment states: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The Court has read § 2 as giving states broad lati-
tude to regulate the conditions under which alcohol is sold or distributed. See, e.g., Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 41 (1966); Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330
(1964); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). In LaRue the Court noted that "the broad sweep
of the Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than normal
state authority over public health, welfare, and morals." Id. at 114. Thus, the Court has avoided
the nude dancing question by suggesting that any First Amendment protection afforded nude
dancing would be outweighed by the State's Twenty-first Amendment power to regulate the sale of
alcohol. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (discussed infra at notes 44-49 and
accompanying text); New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (discussed
infra at notes 60-63 and accompanying text). See also Been, supra note 29, at 8. See generally
Daniel Ramczyk, Note, Constitutional Law-Regulating Nude Dancing In Liquor Establish-
ments-The Preferred Position of the Twenty-First Amendment-Nail v. Baca, 12 N.1. L. REv.
611 (1982).
40. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 118-19.
43. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the six member majority, stated:
The substance of the regulations struck down prohibits licensed bars or nightclubs from dis-
playing, either in the form of movies or live entertainment, "performances" that partake of
more gross sexuality than of communication .... This is not to say that all such conduct
and performance are without the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But we
would poorly serve both the interests for which the State may validly seek vindication and the
interests protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments were we to insist that the sort
of bacchanalian revelries that the Department sought to prevent by these liquor regulations
were the constitutional equivalent of a performance by a scantily clad ballet troupe in a
theater.
44. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
45. Id.
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tion.4 e Citing LaRue, the Court stated that nude dancing might be enti-
tled to First Amendment protection in some circumstances. 1 The Court
held that the ordinance in Doran was overbroad because it applied to
all commercial establishments, not just those serving alcohol, and was
not justifiable under the Twenty-first Amendment. 8 Thus, the Court
decided both Doran and LaRue on the basis of the states' regulatory
power under the Twenty-first Amendment.49
The Supreme Court next encountered the nude dancing issue in
1981 in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim.s0 The Schad case further
strengthened the implication that nonobscene nude dancing constituted
protected expression. In Schad the defendants operated an adult book-
store which contained a coin-operated machine that allowed a customer
to watch a live nude dancer perform behind a glass panel."' The defend-
ants were convicted under a local ordinance banning all live nude en-
tertainment in the borough.5 2 The Supreme Court reversed the
convictions by holding that the ordinance was overbroad.5 The Court,
however, still refused to define precisely the scope of the constitutional
protection. The Court simply stated that nude dancing was not without
First Amendment protection.5 4 The Court also noted that nudity alone
does not place otherwise protected material outside the scope of the
First Amendment.5
In Schad Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the First Amendment de-
manded reversal of the defendants' convictions. 6 In his dissent, Chief
46. Id. at 934.
47. Id. at 932.
48. Id. at 933-34.
49. Justice Rehnquist stated:
In LaRue... we concluded that the broad powers of the States to regulate the sale of liquor,
conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, outweighed any First Amendment interest in
nude dancing and that a State could therefore ban such dancing as a part of its liquor license
program.
In the present case, the challenged ordinance applies not merely to places which serve
liquor, but to many other establishments as well.
Id. at 932-33.
50. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 74.
54. Justice White stated that "as the state courts in this case recognized, nude dancing is not
without its First Amendment protections from official regulation." Id. at 66.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 86-88. But see Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990),
where Judge Flaum, writing for the majority, stated that Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Schad
accepted the majority's view on nude dancing. Id. at 1084. While Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Schad does suggest that nude dancing under certain circumstances may constitute protected ex-
pression, Judge Flaum's interpretation of Chief Justice Burger's dissent as "accept[ing] the major-
[Vol. 45:237
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Justice Burger suggested that, while such a broad ordinance may in
some cases violate the First Amendment, it did not in this case.57 He
stated that it was nonsense to impose First Amendment protection on
every form of expression in every community. 58 Chief Justice Burger
suggested that to protect the activity at issue in this case would trivial-
ize and demean the First Amendment.
59
In the next nude dancing case before the Supreme Court, New
York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca,60 the defendants were owners
of nightclubs, bars, and restaurants that offered topless dancing to their
patrons. 1 A New York statute prohibited nude dancing in establish-
ments licensed by the State to sell liquor.6 2 Following its holding in La-
Rue, the Court concluded that any presumptive First Amendment
protection implicated by nude dancing was overcome by the State's
powers under the Twenty-first Amendment.
63
In 1986 the Supreme Court again avoided addressing the First
Amendment question. In Young v. Arkansas6 4 the defendant was a
nude dancer at a tavern in Little Rock, Arkansas. 5 An Arkansas statute
criminalized nonobscene nudity in any public place as long as its pur-
pose was to gratify the sexual desires of another person.6 6 Since the
statute was not limited to places licensed to serve alcohol, Arkansas
could not rely on its regulatory power under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment to justify the statute. 7 The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that
the defendant's conduct violated the statute and that her behavior was
not protected by the First Amendment.6 8 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the case.6 9 Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, dis-
ity's view on nude dancing" ignores the strong language of Chief Justice Burger's opinion. See
infra note 58.
57. 452 U.S. at 86.
58. Chief Justice Burger stated:
To say that there is a First Amendment right to impose every form of expression on every
community, including the kind of "expression" involved here, is sheer nonsense. To enshrine
such a notion in the Constitution ignores fundamental values that the Constitution ought to
protect. To invoke the First Amendment to protect the activity involved in this case trivial-
izes and demeans that great Amendment.
Id. at 88.
59. Id.
60. 452 U.S. 714 (1981).
61. Id. at 715.
62. Id. at 714.
63. Id. at 715-18.
64. 474 U.S. 1070 (1985) (White and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1072.
68. Id. at 1071.
69. Id. at 1070.
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sented from the denial of certiorari because he believed that the Court
should confront directly the scope of the First Amendment in this
area.
70
In cases subsequent to Young v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court con-
tinued to imply that nonobscene nude dancing might be protected by
the First Amendment.71 While the implication that nude dancing was
protected expression was clear, 2 the Court was unwilling to address
this issue directly. In Barnes the Court, for the first time, squarely ad-
dressed the issue of whether nonobscene nude dancing was protected by
the First Amendment.
III. SETTING THE STAGE: MILLER V. CIVIL CITY OF SOUTH BEND
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. began as three separate actions filed
in 1985 in the Indiana district courts. In Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pear-
son 73 Gayle Sutro, Carla Johnson, and Glen Theatre, Inc. brought the
first action against the City of South Bend, Indiana. Glen Theatre ran a
business called the Chippewa Bookstore, an adult bookstore in which
customers could sit in booths and view live nude and seminude dancers
through a glass panel. Glen Theatre did not sell or permit alcoholic bev-
erages in the Chippewa Bookstore.74 Gayle Sutro and Carla Johnson
were nude dancers employed at this establishment.
In Miller v. Civil City of South Bend 5 Darlene Miller and JR's
Kitty Kat Lounge brought the second action against the City of South
Bend and the Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Committee. JR's Kitty Kat
Lounge sold alcoholic beverages and offered "go-go" dancing.76 Darlene
Miller was a dancer at the lounge, but she typically did not perform
totally nude for fear of criminal prosecution.77 Ms. Miller danced nude
on July 27, 1985 until the police arrived and arrested her.78
In Diamond v. Civil City of South Bend7 9 Sandy Diamond, Lynn
70. Id. at 1072.
71. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 591 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), in which
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, noted that Schad afforded
nude dancing protection as expression under the First Amendment. See also FWIPBS, Inc., dba
Paris Adult Bookstore H v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596, 604 (1990), in which the Court cited
Schad in suggesting that nude dancing was protected under the First Amendment.
72. See Been, supra note 29, at 8.
73. 802 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1986).
74. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 419 (N.D. Ind. 1988),
rev'd sub noam. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
75. No. S85-598 (N.D. Ind. filed May 5, 1986).
76. 695 F. Supp. 414, 420.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 420-21.
79. No. S85-722 (N.D. Ind. filed May 5, 1986).
[Vol. 45:237
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Jacobs, the 720 Corporation (Ramona's Car Wash), and the 726 Corpo-
ration (Ace-Hi Lounge) brought the third action against the same de-
fendants as in Miller. Both Ramona's Car Wash and the Ace-Hi Lounge
sold alcoholic beverages and offered exotic dancing.8 0 Sandy Diamond
and Lynn Jacobs were go-go dancers at these establishments, but
neither woman danced totally nude for fear of criminal prosecution.81
The plaintiffs in all three actions sought injunctive relief prohibit-
ing the defendants from enforcing the Indiana public indecency stat-
ute. 2 The plaintiffs claimed that enforcement of the statute, which
prevented them from performing their dances without pasties or G-
strings, violated their freedom of expression under the First
Amendment. 3
In Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson district court Judge Allen Sharp
granted the plaintiffs' injunction. 4 Judge Sharp held that the statute
was overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional. 5 In the Miller and Dia-
mond cases, however, a different district court judge denied the prelimi-
nary injunction after finding that the Twenty-first Amendment
permitted the prohibition of nude dancing where alcohol was sold. 6
On appeal of Judge Sharp's Glen Theatre holding, the Seventh
Circuit reversed. Previously, the Seventh Circuit had affirmed the Indi-
ana Supreme Court's holding in State v. Baysinger8 7 that the public
80. 695 F. Supp. at 421.
81. Id.
82. 695 F. Supp. at 419-20. For the relevant portion of the statute, see supra note 3.
83. In Gayle Sutro's affidavit to the district court, she described her nude dancing as "an art
form I consider to be artistic," and her dances as "appropriately choreographed and. . . an at-
tempt to communicate as well as entertain." Brief for Petitioners at 5-6, Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (No. 90-26).
The district court described Darlene Miller's testimony of her work at JR's Kitty Kat Lounge
as follows:
Ms. Miller sells drinks and dances at the Kitty Kat. She has worked at the Kitty Kat for
about two years and currently makes $250.00 to $300.00 per week. When she dances, Ms.
Miller perceives herself as "just entertaining, just dancing". The avowed purpose of her dance
is to try to get customers to like her so that they will buy more drinks later. Ms. Miller dances
"go-go", sometimes fast, sometimes slow. She dances to music from a juke box. Ms. Miller
wants to dance nude because she believes she would make more money doing so.
695 F. Supp. at 420.
The district court described Sally Diamond's testimony of her work at Ramona's Car Wash as
follows:
Ms. Diamond dances in costumes designed for her acts; she dances to her own taped music.
Her acts are designed to "create a fantasy in the minds" of her patrons. She perceives herself
to be acting when she dances, and believes, based upon the applause she receives, that she
entertains those who see her perform.
Id. at 422.
84. See Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287, 287 (7th Cir. 1986).
85. Id.
86. No. S85-598 (N.D. Ind. filed May 5, 1986); No. S85-722 (N.D. Ind. filed May 5, 1986).
87. 397 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1979).
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indecency statute was not overbroad.8 8 The Seventh Circuit, however,
remanded Glen Theatre to the district court to examine the plaintiffs'
evidence and to determine whether the activity at issue should be af-
forded First Amendment protection."' The court also remanded and
transferred the Miller and Diamond cases in order to consolidate all the
nude dancing caseg.90
The Miller and Diamond plaintiffs submitted videotapes91 of four
nude dancers as evidence for the district court's consideration. The
Glen Theatre plaintiffs relied only on an affidavit of Gayle Sutro
describing her dancing.9 2 The district court found that the activity at
issue was mere conduct and, as such, was not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection. 5 The Glen Theatre and Miller plaintiffs appealed this
ruling.
On appeal, a sharply divided Seventh Circuit reversed.9 4 The court
held that all nonobscene nude dancing performed as entertainment was
expressive activity protected by the First Amendment.9 5 Judge Flaum,
writing for the majority, emphasized Supreme Court precedent 6 that
supported the court's finding that nude dancing was entitled to First
Amendment protection. Judge Flaum also explored the history and
meaning of dance and concluded that dance was one of the oldest
means of expression known to man.' He then rejected the notion of
distinguishing high art from low entertainment.9 He stated that such a
distinction would remove First Amendment protection from many
forms of nonverbal expression simply because they fail to communicate
88. Glen Theatre, 802 F.2d at 288-90.
89. Id. at 291.
90. 695 F. Supp. at 415.
91. The district court described one videotape as follows:
The tape consists of four separate performances. The performances are basically identical.
They consist of a female, fully clothed initially, who dances to one or more songs as she pro-
ceeds to remove her clothing. Each dance ends with the dancer totally nude or nearly nude.
The dances are done on a stage or on a bar and are not a part of any type of play or dramatic
performance. They are simply what are commonly referred to as "striptease" acts.
Id. at 416.
92. Id. at 419-20. The Glen Theatre burned down in 1988. The cause of action, thus, became
moot to that plaintiff. Id. at 416.
93. Id. at 419.
94. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), rev'd Barnes v. Glen Thea-
tre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
95. Id. at 1085.
96. Id. at 1084.
97. Judge Flaum concluded that, from his reading of Supreme Court precedent, "we are con-
strained to hold today that, as a matter of law, non-obscene nude dancing performed as entertain-
ment is expression and as such is entitled to limited protection under the first amendment." Id. at
1085.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1086.
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an accepted intellectual idea.100
Finally, Judge Flaum applied the two-part test created by the Su-
preme Court in Texas v. Johnson'0 for determining whether an activity
is sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection. 02 He
concluded that nude dancing, while clearly of inferior artistic and aes-
thetic quality, was nonetheless sufficiently communicative to invoke
First Amendment protection. 03 Judge Flaum held, therefore, that the
Indiana public indecency statute was overbroad and unconstitutional.
0 4
In addition to Judge Flaum's majority opinion, the Seventh Circuit
filed five separate opinions in Miller. °5 Judge Cudahy's concurrence
suggested that striptease dancing was undoubtedly expressive. e06 Judge
Posner, in a well-reasoned concurrence, argued that expression is a con-
tinuum, with a vast gray area between expressive and nonexpressive ac-
tivity. 0 1 Judge Posner concluded that placing striptease dancing on the
nonexpressive side of that continuum would deprive most art of consti-
tutional protection. 0 8 Each of the concurring judges agreed that, since
nude dancing was protected expression, the Indiana statute as applied
was overbroad and unconstitutional.0 9
Judge Easterbrook argued in his dissenting opinion that courts
should adhere to the broad categories of speech and conduct in deciding
First Amendment issues.1 0 He suggested that any attempt to discern
expressiveness beyond those broad categories draws the court into the
100. Id.
101. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). For an explanation of the Texas v. Johnson test, see infra notes
250-54 and accompanying text.
102. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1086-87.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1089.
105. Judges Cudahy and Posner filed separate concurring opinions. Id. at 1089-1104. Judge
Coffey filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1104-20. Judge Easterbrook filed a dissenting opinion in
which Judges Manion and Kanne joined and in which Judge Coffey joined in part. Id. at 1120-31.
Judge Manion filed a dissenting opinion in which Judges Coffey and Easterbrook joined. Id. at
1131-35.
106. Id. at 1089.
107. Id. at 1098-99.
108. Judge Posner stated:
There are some clearly expressive activities and some clearly nonexpressive ones but there is
also a vast gray area populated by street performers who swallow swords or walk on glowing
coals or guess people's ages or weights, by people who wish to make a "statement" by dressing
outlandishly, by creators of video games, by contestants in dance marathons, and so on with-
out end .... What is indefensible is to set up "entertainment" as a category of activities,
distinct from "art," that government can regulate without regard to the First Amendment. Or
to suppose-unless one is prepared to deprive most art of constitutional protection-that
there is a rational conception of "expression" that places striptease dancing on the nonexpres-
sive side of the divide.
109. Id. at 1089, 1104.
110. Id. at 1129-30.
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province of the legislator.111 Judge Easterbrook stated that nude danc-
ing was conduct, not speech.112 Thus, he concluded that the Indiana
statute's prohibition of nude dancing was constitutional." 3
Judge Coffey's emotional dissent" 4 argued that the Framers of the
Constitution never contemplated a living or evolving interpretation of
the Constitution that would sanction the protection of nude dancing.1
1 5
Judge Coffey observed that striptease dancing contributed to the degra-
dation of women." 6 Thus, he concluded that no reason existed to pro-
hibit Indiana from banning this activity, regardless of any alleged First
Amendment right."
7
Judge Manion's dissent argued that the court should defer to the
district court's finding that the activities at issue contained no expres-
sive element." 8 Judge Manion also argued that the Indiana statute was
valid even if nude dancing was inherently expressive because the gov-
ernmental interest in preventing public indecency and immorality out-
weighed whatever limited First Amendment rights were implicated by
striptease dancing. 19
111. Judge Easterbrook stated:
The First Amendment is designed to get government out of the business of regulating speech
while preserving to legislators freedom to act with respect to other human affairs.
. . . "Conduct" and "speech" are the principal categories, and observing that distinction
is essential if we wish to maintain the boundary between legislative and judicial roles in a
democratic society.
Id. at 1130.
112. Judge Easterbrook stated that "[p]arading in a state of undress is conduct, not speech."
Id. at 1124. Judge Easterbrook also stated specifically that "dancing is not 'speech.'" Id. at 1123.
113. Id. at 1131.
114. Id. at 1104-20. Judge Coffey stated:
Personally, I do not mind being labeled a "busybody" or a "prude" as I write to uphold the
moral ethics, ideals and principles of the majority of the people of the State of Indiana speak-
ing through their legislative representatives .... I would add that neither others nor myself
are paternalistic or wish to force our moral beliefs on society. We merely recognize the right of
the people ... to implement their beliefs and conceptions of proper moral principles through
their legislature.
Id. at 1109.
115. Id. at 1105.
116. Judge Coffey stated that "nude dancing harms the performers, the audience and society
... through the degradation of women that results from their treatment solely as objects for lust-
ful male sexual passions and appetites." Id. at 1109. Judge Coffey also suggested that striptease
dances "undeniably underscore the notion that a woman exists solely for the sexual satisfaction of
a controlling group of males." Id.
Judge Coffey did not mention the Indiana statute's restriction on male striptease through the
prohibition of the "showing of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state." IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-45-4-1(b) (1985).
117. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1110 (7th Cir. 1990). Judge Coffey
further suggested that this alleged First Amendment right "is based on a foundation of quick-
sand." Id.
118. Id. at 1131.
119. Id. at 1135.
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IV. THE PERFORMANCE: BARNES V. GLEN THEATRE, INC.
On certiorari the Supreme Court, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
reversed the Seventh Circuit's holding in Miller.12 0 The Court agreed
that nude dancing deserved some First Amendment protection, 121 but it
held that Indiana's prohibition of nude dancing through its public inde-
cency statute was constitutional. 2 2 The Court in Barnes did not focus
on the issue of whether nude dancing was protected by the First
Amendment. 2 3 Instead, the Court focused on Indiana's statute as a
constitutional infringement of the protected activity.
A. Nude Dancing As Expressive Activity
A plurality of the Supreme Court concluded, without analysis, that
nude dancing was expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the
First Amendment.124 Chief Justice Rehnquist simply cited prior Su-
preme Court cases to conclude that nude dancing was protected expres-
sion. 125 He proceeded, however, to uphold the Indiana public indecency
statute as a constitutional prohibition of that protected activity.126
Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the plural-
ity that nude dancing deserved First Amendment protection. 27 Justice
Souter stated that not all dancing was entitled to First Amendment
protection. 28 He believed, however, that performance dancing aimed at
an actual or hypothetical audience was expressive activity. 29 Justice
Souter also upheld the Indiana statute as a justifiable regulation of that
120. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
121. Id. at 2460.
122. Id. at 2458-63.
123. The Barnes Court followed prior nude dancing cases in simply assuming that nude
dancing was entitled to some level of First Amendment protection.
124. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "nude dancing of the
kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment, though we viewed it as only marginally so." Id. at 2460.
125. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited language from Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922
(1975), California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61 (1981). For a discussion of the Court's treatment of the nude dancing issue in those cases,
see supra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
126. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458-63. For a discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion of
the Indiana statute, see infra notes 136-55 and accompanying text.
127. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated:
[D]ancing as a performance ... gives expression at least to generalized emotion or feeling,
and where the dancer is nude or nearly so the feeling expressed, in the absence of some con-
trary clue, is eroticism, carrying an endorsement of erotic experience. Such is the expressive






Justice White, in his dissent, also quickly disposed of the nude
dancing question. He was not surprised that, in light of Supreme Court
precedent, the Court conceded that nude dancing deserved First
Amendment protection. 13  Importantly, Justice White indicated that
the Court, while purporting to recognize nude dancing as expressive ac-
tivity, distorted and ignored settled First Amendment doctrine. 32 Jus-
tice White believed that this manipulation of doctrine achieved a result
that reflected the Court's assessment of the artistic merits of nude
dancing.
33
Justice Scalia was the only member of the Supreme Court who did
not accept the proposition that nude dancing was a protected activity.
He upheld the statute on the basis that it regulated conduct not expres-
sion.13 4 Justice Scalia suggested that even though some people may em-
ploy a prohibited form of conduct as a means of expression, the State is
not required to satisfy some higher level of scrutiny to justify its
prohibition.1
3 5
B. Indiana's Public Indecency Statute
After concluding that nude dancing deserved some level of First
Amendment protection, 36 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plu-
rality, held that the Indiana public indecency statute's requirement
that dancers must wear pasties and G-strings did not violate the First
Amendment. 37 To determine whether the statute was a permissible
regulation of the protected activity,13  Chief Justice Rehnquist applied
130. Id. at 2471. For an analysis of Justice Souter's opinion in upholding the statute, see
infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
131. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2474-75. Justice White stated:
That the performances in the Kitty Kat Lounge may not be high art, to say the least, and
may not appeal to the Court, is hardly an excuse for distorting and ignoring settled doctrine.
The Court's assessment of the artistic merits of nude dancing performances should not be the
determining factor in deciding this case.
Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2468. Justice Scalia stated that "[t]he State is regulating conduct, not expression,
and those who choose to employ conduct as a means of expression must make sure that the con-
duct they select is not generally forbidden." Id.
136. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
137. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991).
138. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that, since the statute prohibited only nudity and not
the dances themselves, the statute was a "time, place, or manner" restriction. Id. at 2461. In Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), the Court stated that even when a government regu-
lation directly infringed upon expression, the First Amendment permitted "reasonable restrictions
on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without
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the four-part test set forth in United States v. O'Brien.1
3 9
In O'Brien the Court held that expressive conduct could be nar-
rowly regulated in pursuit of a substantial governmental interest that
was unrelated to the content of the expression. 140 The Court specifically
held that a government regulation that incidentally infringed on First
Amendment freedoms was sufficiently justified if: (1) the regulation was
within the constitutional power of the government; (2) the regulation
furthered an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the
governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and (4) the incidental restriction on the First Amendment free-




In Barnes Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that Indiana's pub-
lic indecency statute satisfied all four aspects of the O'Brien test.
42
Chief Justice Rehnquist began by noting that the statute was clearly
within Indiana's constitutional power. 148 He then admitted that it was
impossible to identify what interests motivated the Indiana legisla-
ture. 14 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist determined, however, that the language
and history of the statute suggested a purpose of protecting societal or-
der and morality.14 He concluded that Indiana's substantial interest in
protecting public order and morality satisfied the second prong of the
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communica-
tion of the information.'" Id. at 791, quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984). In Community for Creative Non-Violence the Court indicated that the time,
place, or manner inquiry embodied the same standards set forth in O'Brien. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist in Barnes, therefore, applied the O'Brien test to Indiana's prohibition of nude dancing. For a
criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist's treatment of Indiana's complete prohibition of nude dancing
as a time, place, or manner restriction, see infra notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
139. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien the defendant burned his draft card in front of a crowd
to protest the Vietnam War. He was convicted of violating a statute that prohibited the knowing
destruction or mutilation of draft cards. He challenged his conviction on the basis that his actions
were expressive, and, therefore, protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 370. The Supreme Court
assumed for the purposes of discussion that O'Brien's action was symbolic speech or expressive
conduct, but rejected the argument that symbolic speech was entitled to full protection under the
First Amendment. Id. at 376-77.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461-63.
143. Under the traditional police power given to the states, Indiana can pass laws regulating
public health, safety, and morals. Id. at 2462.
144. Id. at 2461. It was impossible to discern the statute's specific purpose because Indiana
does not record legislative history. Id.
145. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that in general "[t]his and other public indecency stat-
utes were designed to protect morals and public order." Id. at 2462. Chief Justice Rehnquist also
noted that almost every state has a public indecency statute of some sort. Indiana has had a ver-
sion of this statute since 1831. Id.
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O'Brien test.14
Chief Justice Rehnquist next suggested that Indiana's interest in
protecting public order and morality was unrelated to the suppression
of free expression. 47 He admitted that almost any type of conduct ar-
guably could be considered expressive. 48 In O'Brien, however, the
Court had rejected such an expansive interpretation of expression.
49
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Indiana public indecency stat-
ute was a broad proscription of any conduct involving nudity. °50 He re-
fused to believe that the statute proscribed nudity because of the erotic
message conveyed by the dancers.' 51 Chief Justice Rehnquist believed
that the evil addressed by the statute was public nudity in general,
whether or not the nudity was part of expressive activity.
52
Last, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the Indiana public
indecency statute also met the fourth prong of the O'Brien test. He sug-
gested that the statute's incidental restriction on the First Amendment
was no greater than was essential to further Indiana's interest in public
order and morality.15 He held that the requirement that dancers wear
pasties and G-strings was a modest regulation that created a minimal
interference with the First Amendment.5 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the plurality, thus held that Indiana's public indecency stat-
ute permissibly infringed on the protected expression of nude
dancing.8 5
Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, also concluded that the
146. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973), for
the proposition that "this Court implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act. . . to
protect the 'societal interest in order and morality.'"
147. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462.
148. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
It can be argued, of course, that almost limitless types of conduct-including appearing in the
nude in public-are "expressive," and in one sense of the word this is true. People who go
about in the nude in public may be expressing something about themselves by so doing.
Id.
149. "We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be la-
belled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
150. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
151. Id.
152. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
The perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity. The
appearance of people of all shapes, sizes and ages in the nude at a beach, for example, would
convey little if any erotic message, yet the State still seeks to prevent it. Public nudity is the







statute's prohibition of nude dancing was constitutional.156 He agreed
with the plurality that the four-part O'Brien test was the appropriate
standard for analyzing the Indiana statute.157 He wrote separately, how-
ever, to suggest that the State's interest in banning nude dancing was
the deterrence of the secondary effects 158 of adult entertainment estab-
lishments.5 9 Justice Souter found that the statute satisfied the third
requirement of the O'Brien test because the regulation sought to thwart
the evils of striptease establishments and thus was unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. 60
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, agreed with the plurality that the
Indiana statute was constitutionally valid, but disagreed that the regu-
lation triggered First Amendment analysis.' 6 ' He believed that the reg-
ulation should be upheld because it was a general law that regulated
conduct, not expression.62 Justice Scalia acknowledged, however, that
156. Id. at 2468.
157. Id.
158. The petitioners in Barnes stated that Indiana's statute applied to nude dancing because
such dancing "encourag[es] prostitution, increas[es] sexual assaults, and attract[s] other criminal
activity." See id. at 2469 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 37).
159. Id. Justice Souter was not troubled by his inability to prove that the Indiana legislature
was motivated by his secondary effects theory. He felt the "appropriate focus is not an empirical
inquiry into the actual intent of the enacting legislature, but rather the existence or not of a cur-
rent governmental interest in the service of which the challenged application of the statute may be
constitutional." Id. Justice Souter wanted to find a justification for the particular application of
the statute at issue, rather than a justification that would support all possible applications of the
statute. Id.
160. Justice Souter acknowledged the strength of Justice White's argument that Indiana
sought to prohibit nude dancing as a means of combating secondary effects because of the message
of eroticism that nude dancing communicated. Id. at 2470. Justice Souter denied, however, that a
causal relationship necessarily existed between the message of the nude dancing and the secondary
effects. He stated:
To say that pernicious secondary effects are associated with nude dancing establishments is
not necessarily to say that such effects result from the persuasive effect of the expression
inherent in nude dancing. It is to say, rather, only that the effects are correlated with the
existence of establishments offering such dancing, without deciding what the precise causes of
the correlation actually are.
Id.
Justice White responded to this argument in his dissent, stating:
If Justice Souter is correct that there is no causal connection between the message conveyed
by the nude dancing at issue here and the negative secondary effects that the State desires to
regulate, the State does not have even a rational basis for its absolute prohibition on nude
dancing that is admittedly expressive. Furthermore, if the real problem is the "concentration
of crowds of men predisposed to the" designated evils .... then the First Amendment re-
quires that the State address that problem in a fashion that does not include banning an
entire category of expressive activity.
Id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring). See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
162. Id. Justice Scalia stated: "In my view, however, the challenged regulation must be up-
held, not because it survives some lower level of First-Amendment scrutiny, but because, as a
general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First-
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expressive conduct might deserve some First Amendment protection. 1 3
He noted that the government cannot prohibit conduct precisely be-
cause of its communicative attributes."" He rejected, however, the plu-
rality's application of the O'Brien test's intermediate level of scrutiny
to Indiana's public indecency statute.1 5 Justice Scalia argued that the
O'Brien test would not apply to such a regulation of pure conduct.166
Because the Indiana statute regulated conduct, and not expression, Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that Indiana could enforce its prohibition of pub-
lic nudity against those who use nudity as a means of communication.
16 7
Justice White, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens, agreed with the plurality and Justice Souter that nude
dancing was expression protected by the First Amendment. 168 Justice
White, however, concluded that Indiana's public indecency statute un-
constitutionally prohibited nude dancing.169 Justice White noted that
the State did not argue that Indiana's public indecency statute prohib-
ited all nudity wherever it occurred. 170 The State, for example, never
attempted to apply the statute to nudity in plays, ballets, or operas.'
Justice White also noted that in State v. Baysinger the Indiana Su-
preme Court held that the public indecency statute did not prohibit
Amenchaent scrutiny at all." Id.
163. Id. at 2466.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Justice Scalia stated: "It cannot reasonably be demanded, therefore, that every restric-
tion of expression incidentally proceeded by a general law regulating conduct pass normal First-
Amendment scrutiny, or even-as some of our cases have suggested, see, e.g., United States v.
O'Brien,. . . -that it be justified by an 'important or substantial' government interest." Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
Justice Scalia also indicated that intermediate standards of analysis in general should not
exist. Id. at 2467. He further stated, "I think we should avoid wherever possible. . . a method of
analysis that requires judicial assessment of the 'importance' of government interests-and espe-
cially of government interests in various aspects of morality." Id.
167. Id. at 2468.
168. Id. at 2471 (White, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice White's treatment of the
nude dancing issue, see supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
169. Barnes at 2474-76 (White, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2472-73. Justice White specifically stated:
[I]n this case Indiana does not suggest that its statute applies to, or could be applied to,
nudity wherever it occurs, including the home. We do not understand the Court or Justice
Scalia to be suggesting that Indiana could constitutionally enact such an intrusive prohibi-
tion, nor do we think such a prohibition would be tenable in light of our decision in Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), in which we held that States could not punish the mere posses-
sion of obscenity in the privacy of one's own home.
Id. at 2472.
171. Id. at 2473. The State had argued that the evils sought to be avoided by application of
this statute to nude dancing would not be served by application of the statute to plays or ballets.
Id. Justice White also found persuasive an affidavit of a police sergeant which stated that "[n]o
arrests have ever been made for nudity as part of a play or ballet." Id.
256
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nudity as a part of a larger form of expression. 17 2 Therefore, Justice
White reasoned that Indiana's statute was not a general prohibition of
all nudity.173 Rather, the Indiana law regulated some kinds of nudity
while leaving other kinds of nudity unregulated. 17 4 The O'Brien test
places the burden on the State to justify such a distinction.
17 5
Justice White agreed with Justice Souter that the deterrence of the
secondary effects caused by nude dancing was the State's goal underly-
ing this supposedly content-neutral statute.7 6 Since the attainment of
these goals depended on prevention of the expressive activity, Justice
White reasoned that the statutory prohibition was related to the con-
tent of the expression.17 7 Justice White determined that Indiana sought
to regulate nude dancing precisely because of its message of eroticism
and sensuality. 7 8 Justice White, thus, suggested that the statute, as ap-
plied, was a content-based restriction and, therefore, should be upheld
only if it was narrowly drawn to satisfy a compelling State interest.17
He concluded that the Indiana statute was not narrowly drawn'80 and
172. Id. at 2473. For a discussion of the Indiana Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Bays-
inger, see infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
173. Id. at 2473. Justice White criticized the plurality and Justice Scalia for failing to recog-
nize that Indiana's statute differed from the laws in O'Brien and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986). The cases, relied on in the plurality's O'Brien analysis, involved "truly general proscrip-
tions on individual conduct." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472. In O'Brien the federal statute completely
prohibited the intentional destruction or mutilation of a draft card. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In Bowers
the Georgia statute completely banned sodomy. Thus, in both O'Brien and Bowers the statutes
banned those activities anywhere, anyhow, and anytime.
174. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473.
175. Id.
176. Id. Justice White observed that Indiana's interest underlying its public indecency stat-
ute included the "deterrence of prostitution, sex assaults, criminal activity, degradation of women,
and other activities which break down the family structure." Id. (quoting Reply Brief for Petition-
ers at 11).
177. Id. at 2474.
178. Id. at 2474-76. In addressing the argument that nudity was conduct independent from
any expressive element in the dance, Justice White stated:
The sight of a fully clothed, or even a partially clothed, dancer generally will have a far differ-
ent impact on a spectator than that of a nude dancer, even if the same dance is performed.
The nudity is itself an expressive component of the dance, not merely incidental "conduct."
Id. at 2474.
Justice White concluded that the Indiana statute "as applied to nude dancing, targets the
expressive activity itself; in Indiana nudity in a dancing performance is a crime because of the
message such dancing communicates." Id. at 2476.
179. Id. at 2474.
180. Justice White stated:
[T]he State clearly has the authority to criminalize prostitution and obscene behavior. Ban-
ning an entire category of expressive activity, however, generally does not satisfy the narrow
tailoring requirement of strict First Amendment scrutiny .... Furthermore, if nude dancing
in barrooms, as compared with other establishments, is the most worrisome problem, the
State could invoke its Twenty-first Amendment powers and impose appropriate regulation.
Id. at 2475 (citation omitted).
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could not withstand strict scrutiny, even if the State could establish a
compelling interest.""'
V. THE BOTTOM LINE: THE FALLACY OF BARNES
The Barnes Court's analysis was flawed in two respects. First, the
Court wrongly suggested that Indiana's public indecency statute was a
general proscription of all nudity that only incidentally infringed on the
protected expression of nude dance. The Indiana Supreme Court's in-
terpretation and the State's enforcement of the statute indicated that
Indiana selectively prohibited nude dancing because the message of the
expression was offensive. The Barnes Court, therefore, should have ap-
plied a more exacting scrutiny and determined that Indiana's selective
prohibition of nude dancing was unconstitutional. Second, assuming ar-
guendo that the Court was correct in applying a less vigorous level of
scrutiny under O'Brien, Indiana's interest in regulating public nudity
did not justify the complete prohibition of this important expressive
medium.
A. The Naked Truth: Indiana's Selective Prohibition of Nudity
When a state law targets the particular message of a protected ac-
tivity, the law must withstand strict scrutiny analysis.'s If the law,
however, is a general proscription of conduct which only accidentally
infringes on the protected expression, then the less exacting O'Brien
test is appropriate. 183 The Barnes Court applied the O'Brien test be-
cause it suggested that Indiana's public indecency statute was a general
proscription of public nudity that only incidentally interfered with
nude dancing.' The Court's reasoning, however, ignored Indiana's in-
terpretation and application of its own statute. Thus, the decision in
Justice White further suggested that other means existed by which the State might address
the evils sought to be eliminated by the statute. See infra note 232.
181. Id. at 2475-76.
182. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 317
(1983). Under strict scrutiny analysis, the State must have a compelling interest and the infringe-
ment on expression must be no greater than is essential to further that interest. United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
183. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien test weighs the interests
of the State in regulating the nonspeech against the value of the infringed speech and the extent of
the infringement. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
Justice Scalia's constitutional doctrine rejects this weighing of interests when the State's regu-
lation incidentally interferes with constitutional expression. Rather, Justice Scalia believes that the
First Amendment only applies when the State specifically targets the protected expression. Since
Justice Scalia did not believe that Indiana targeted nude dancing, he refused to use any balancing
test. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text. He concluded that the First Amendment was
not implicated by Indiana's prohibition of nude dancing. See id.
184. Barnes at 2463 (plurality).
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Barnes embraced the impermissible result of allowing states to prohibit
nude dancing when they find its message offensive.
1. Indiana's Interpretation and Enforcement of Its Public Indecency
Statute
In State v. Baysinger s5 the Indiana Supreme Court first consid-
ered the scope of Indiana's public indecency statute. In Baysinger the
defendants 86 challenged Indiana's public indecency statute as being
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.1 7 The Indiana Supreme Court
interpreted the statute to prohibit nude entertainment in theaters,
nightclubs, and other public establishments."8 8 In an effort to save the
constitutionality of the statute, the Indiana court conceded that some
nudity, as part of expressive performances, would merit constitutional
protection. 89 Specifically, the court noted that the statute could not be
applied to larger forms of expression involving the communication of
ideas. 10 The court concluded, however, that nude dancing was mere
conduct without the expression of ideas.'"' The court, therefore, upheld
the application of the public indecency statute to the nude dancing at
issue. 19
185. 397 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1979).
186. The defendants in Baysinger included dancers and owners or operators of bars and tav-
erns that offered nude dancing.
187. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d at 581.
188. Id. at 582-83.
189. Id. at 587. The court stated that "it may be constitutionally required to tolerate or to
allow some nudity as a part of some larger form of expression meriting protection, when the com-
munication of ideas is involved." Id.
190. Id.
191. See id. The court stated:
A critical part of the final issue to be decided relates to whether appearing nude or perform-
ing a nude dance as presented in these cases is simply conduct or is expression entitled to
First Amendment protection. In the cases before us it is clear the activity involved is appear-
ing nude or dancing in the nude in bars and is conduct.... This activity is conduct, not
speech, and as such, this claim does not rise to the level of a First Amendment claim.
Id.
192. Id. at 587. Five years later, in Erhardt v. State, 463 N.E.2d 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984),
the police charged a dance contestant in a "Miss Erotica" contest under Indiana's public indecency
statute when she danced nude during the contest. Id. at 1122. Relying on the statements of the
Indiana Supreme Court in Baysinger, the Indiana Court of Appeals recognized that the public
indecency statute had a narrower scope than its language suggested. Id. at 1123. The Erhardt
court interpreted the Indiana statute as not prohibiting all nudity. Id. The appellate court held
that nude striptease dancing performed in an enclosed theater was protected expression under the
First Amendment and, therefore, was not subject to the public indecency statute. Id. at 1126.
The Indiana Supreme Court, in a five paragraph decision, set aside the appellate court's ruling
in Erhardt. Erhardt v. State, 468 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1984). The supreme court reaffirmed its holding
in Baysinger that nude dancing was not constitutionally protected. Id. The court made a cursory
comment that the statute had withstood constitutional scrutiny in Baysinger and stated that Er-
hardt's conduct fell within the statutory prohibition. Id.
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In Baysinger the Indiana Supreme Court limited the scope of the
public indecency statute to save its constitutionality. 193 Without the
Baysinger exception, the statute was a total proscription of all nudity
at all times in all public places. 194 The United States Supreme Court
made clear in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.19 5 that such a broad proscrip-
tion would be unconstitutional. 96
In creating the Baysinger exception, the Indiana court, thus, inter-
preted the statute as less than a complete proscription of all public
nudity. 17 The State's selective enforcement of the statute also showed
that the statute was not a general proscription of all public nudity. An
Indiana law enforcement official conceded on record that the State did
not prohibit all public nudity under the statute. Specifically, the State
did not prohibit nudity as part of a play or ballet. 98 Thus, Indiana re-
193. See Been, supra note 29, at 2-5.
194. As indicated by the respondents' brief before the Supreme Court, the statute, on its
face, criminalized a wide range of activities. The respondents stated:
[A] simple examination of the statute reveals that it is, unquestionably, facially overbroad, in
that it allows criminalization of dress that falls short of total nudity, and applies in circum-
stances that clearly are not properly subject to criminal proscription. For example, a woman
wearing a thong bikini on a beach, which does not "totally" cover the buttocks, is a criminal
act. [sic] A model in an art class at a University, if totally nude or "nude" within the statute,
can be prosecuted. A male dancer in a ballet, wearing tights in which his genitalia may be in a
"discernably turgid state" can be prosecuted, even though fully and opaquely dressed, and, of
course, anyone caught nude (as statutorily defined) in the local Y.M.C.A. shower had better
seek out legal counsel immediately.
Brief for Respondents, at 31 n.19, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (No. 90-26).
195. 422 U.S. 922 (1974). For a brief analysis of Doran, see supra notes 44-49 and accompa-
nying text.
196. Then-Justice Rehnquist noted in Doran his concern over banning all public nudity in all
circumstances. He stated:
The District Court observed, we believe correctly: "The local ordinance here attacked not
only prohibits topless dancing in bars but also prohibits any female from appearing in 'any
public place' with uncovered breasts. There is no limit to the interpretation of the term 'any
public place.' It could include the theater, town hall, opera house, as well as a public market
place, street or any place of assembly, indoors or outdoors. Thus, this ordinance would pro-
hibit the performance of the 'Ballet Africains' and a number of other works of unquestionable
artistic and socially redeeming significance."
Id. at 933, citing Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp. 478, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
197. 397 N.E.2d 580, 587 (1979). Judge Posner stated in Miller:
The state supreme court, in Baysinger, and the state's highest law enforcement official, in this
case, concur in interpreting the statute not as a blanket prohibition of public nudity (an inter-
pretation that the words of the statute would support), but as a prohibition of nonexpressive
public nudity. That interpretation binds us, and demonstrates that what the state is doing is
singling out a particular form of erotic but not obscene nude performance for condemnation.
We would be inconsistent in affirming the district court's decision out of respect for popular
preferences and states' rights while disregarding the meaning imprinted on the statute by the
state judges and law enforcement officials.
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1103 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
198. "'No arrests have ever been made for nudity as part of a play or ballet.'" Barnes at
2473 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting the affidavit of Sgt. Timothy Corbett).
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fused to apply the indecency statute to forms of nude expression that it
condoned. The statute prohibited nude dancing in striptease establish-
ments because of the perceived offensiveness of the dancers' message.'
2. The Impermissible Result of Barnes
As discussed above, °0 the Indiana Supreme Court held in State v.
Baysinger that the public indecency statute could not be applied to
prohibit nudity in larger forms of expression. The Baysinger court did
not think that nude dancing was a larger form of expression. 20 1 The
United States Supreme Court in Barnes, however, held that it was.202
Under the Indiana Supreme Court's limiting construction of the stat-
ute, therefore, nude dancing would be protected by the Baysinger ex-
ception.03 Yet, the Supreme Court in Barnes held that nude dancing
was constitutionally prohibited by the Indiana statute.20 4 The Barnes
Court's holding, therefore, created the following unacceptable result:
Indiana may apply its public indecency statute to prohibit nude danc-
ing when it finds the message of the dance offensive and allow nude
dancing when it does not find the message offensive. In other words,
after Barnes, the Indiana public indecency statute may ban nude danc-
ing in one context, the tavern or barroom, and allow nude dancing in a
different context, for example the play or ballet. The Barnes decision,
thus, created a distinction between two kinds of nude dancing based on
the content of the expression.20 5
If one accepts the plurality's conclusion that the statute served the
State's interest of protecting public order and morality, then the dis-
tinction between nude dancing in a bar and in a ballet may be under-
standable. The appropriate question, however, is not whether the
distinction is understandable, but whether it is constitutionally permis-
sible. This distinction clearly is based on the offensive nature of the
message of nude striptease dancing.0 6 Since Indiana has chosen to tar-
199. See id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated that "[i]t is only because
nude dancing performances may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism and sensuality among
the spectators that the State seeks to regulate such expressive activity." Id.
200. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 191.
202. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
203. See Brief for Respondents at 29, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)
(No. 90-26).
204. Barnes at 2463. See also supra notes 137-55 and accompanying text.
205. The Barnes Court, therefore, not only condoned, but embraced Indiana's selective pro-
hibition of nude dancing. It acknowledged that the statute's prohibition would not apply in one
expressive context and would function as an absolute ban in another.
206. As Justice White stated:
Since the State permits the dancers to perform if they wear pasties and G-strings but forbids
nude dancing, it is precisely because of the distinctive, expressive content of the nude dancing
1991]
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get this offensive message, it must satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis. 207
Even if protecting public morality can be a compelling state interest,
the Indiana regulation would not survive strict scrutiny because less in-
trusive ways of regulating nude dancing exist.20 8 In sum, the unaccept-
able result of the Court's holding in Barnes was that Indiana could
prohibit expression it found offensive through the selective application
of its public indecency statute.
B. Song and Dance: Indiana's Interests in Prohibiting Nude
Dancing
In applying the O'Brien test, the Court suggested that Indiana's
public indecency statute served the substantial interest of protecting
morals and public order while interfering only minimally with the pro-
tected expression. 2 9 The Court, thus, concluded that the statute satis-
fied the O'Brien test because the regulation furthered a substantial
State interest and the incidental restriction on the protected activity
was no greater than necessary to further that interest.210 Even assuming
arguendo that the Court was correct in applying the less vigorous scru-
tiny of the O'Brien test to Indiana's prohibition of nude dancing, the
performances at issue in this case that the State seeks to apply the statutory prohibition. It is
only because nude dancing performances may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism and
sensuality among the spectators that the State seeks to regulate such expressive activity, ap-
parently on the assumption that creating or emphasizing such thoughts and ideas in the
minds of the spectators may lead to increased prostitution and the degradation of women.
Id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
207. See supra note 182.
208. Strict scrutiny ,analysis requires the Court to determine whether the regulation is the
least restrictive means available to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. See Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 317 (1983). As Justice White noted in Barnes, "[b]anning an entire category
of expressive activity. . . generally does not satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement of strict First
Amendment scrutiny." Barnes at 2475 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 485 (1988)). The State could, for example, impose restrictions on nude dancing through its
Twenty-first Amendment regulatory power or through reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tions. See Barnes at 2474 (White, J., dissenting). See also Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). In Miller Judge Flaum, writing for the majority, stated:
[L]egislative power unquestionably permits the state to bar the imposition of nude dancing
upon the public in settings such as streets, parks and beaches. Similarly, it may regulate
expressive conduct for reasons unrelated to the suppression of speech. . . . It may also regu-
late nude dancing under the power granted it by the twenty-first amendment .... And it
most certainly may ban obscene nude dancing.. . . [Tihe total ban at issue here does not fall
within any of those constitutionally permissible areas of legislation. If the State wishes to
regulate non-obscene expressive activity or public nudity, it may do so, but only in conso-
nance with the first amendment.
Id. at 1088-89.
209. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that there was minimal inferference with the expres-
sion because the erotic dancers were not prohibited from dancing entirely, but were forced to wear
pasties and G-strings during performances. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
210. See Barnes at 2461-63 (plurality).
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Court's analysis was flawed in two respects.
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrongly treated the nudity in nude
dance as if it were conduct severable from the message of the dance.
2 11
He suggested that the requirement that the dancers wear pasties and
G-strings did not deprive the dance of its protected message.212 Rather,
he argued that these requirements made the message only slightly less
graphic.213 He concluded, therefore, that the statute's prohibition satis-
fied the O'Brien test's incidental restriction requirement.2 4
The nudity in nude dance, an expressive component of the
dance, 5 is an essential and fundamental element of the message of
eroticism and sensuality. 218 Indiana's prohibition of nude dancing,
therefore, was not simply a restriction on the manner in which the
dancers communicated their message, but, instead, a complete prohibi-
tion of that particular message.21 7 A complete prohibition of protected
expression cannot satisfy the O'Brien test's minimal interference
requirement.218
The second flaw in the Court's O'Brien analysis stemmed from its
purported justification for the public indecency statute's prohibition.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia argued that Indiana's inter-
est in creating and enforcing its public indecency statute was the pro-
tection of morals and public order.21 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist and
211. See id. at 2463.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: "It is without cavil that the public indecency statute
is 'narrowly tailored;' Indiana's requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties and a G-string is
modest, and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the state's purpose." Id.
215. See id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated that "[t]he nudity element
of nude dancing performances cannot be neatly pigeonholed as mere 'conduct' independent of any
expressive component of the dance." Id.
216. See id.; see also infra note 247.
217. Indiana's prohibition of nude dancing is, thus, distinguishable from other manner re-
strictions. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (dealing with a statute regulat-
ing the volume of music); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (dealing with a statute regulating
the noise of sound trucks). In Ward, for example, the regulation at issue limited the permissible
volume of music. Since the regulation affected only the manner in which the music could be
played, the Court treated it as a time, place, or manner restriction. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. Nudity,
however, is not to nude dancing as volume is to music. With music, the content of the message
does not change with the volume. Nudity in nude dance, on the other hand, goes directly to the
content of the message of the dance. Prohibiting nudity from exotic dance is not analogous to
regulating volume. Rather, it is analogous to prohibiting certain instruments from playing in the
orchestra.
218. See supra note 180.
219. See Barnes at 2461 (plurality); id. at 2464-65 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
more specifically stated that "[t]he purpose of the Indiana statute, as both its text and the manner
of its enforcement demonstrate, is to enforce the traditional moral belief that people should not
expose their private parts indiscriminately, regardless of whether those who see them are disedi-
fled." Id. at 2465.
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Justice Scalia suggested that the State's complete prohibition of public
nudity furthered this interest.22 °
Admittedly, Indiana's public indecency statute in some circum-
stances may serve to protect morals and public order.22' That purpose,
however, cannot justify the application of the statute to prohibit nude
dancing.222 Nude dancing only occurs in closed settings and among con-
senting adults. 23 If the State's interest in protecting morals and public
order extended to nude dancing, it also could extend to nude expression
in private, for example, in the home.224 Indiana made no attempt to
regulate nudity in both public and private.225
If the State's interest in applying this prohibition was not protect-
ing morality and public order, Justice Souter suggested another possible
State interest. As the State argued before the Court 226 and as Justice
Souter recognized,227 the State had an interest in preventing the harm-
ful secondary effects of nude entertainment establishments. 22  Those
secondary effects stemmed from nude dancing's message of eroticism
and sensuality.229 Preventing those effects certainly is an important in-
220. Id. at 2463 (plurality); id. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring).
221. As Justice Souter recognized, the purposes of the statute included, but were not limited
to, protecting morality and public order. See id. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring). See supra note
159.
222. See id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White suggested that:
The purpose of forbidding people from appearing nude in parks, beaches, hot dog stands, and
like public places is to protect others from offense. But that cannot possibly be the purpose of
preventing nude dancing in theaters and barrooms since the viewers are exclusively con-
senting adults who pay money to see these dances. The purpose of the proscription in these




224. As Justice White noted, Indianans are free to "parade around, cavort, and revel in the
nude for hours in front of relatives and friends. It is difficult to see why the State's interest in
morality is any less in that situation." Id. at 2476.
225. See supra note 173.
226. See supra note 158.
227. See Barnes at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring).
228. Justice Souter stated:
I think that we need not so limit ourselves in identifying the justification for the legislation at
issue here, and may legitimately consider petitioners' assertion that the statute is applied to
nude dancing because such dancing "encourag[es] prostitution, increas[es] sexual assaults,
and attract[s] other criminal activity." Brief for Petitioners 37.
This asserted justification for the statute may not be ignored merely because it is unclear
to what extent this purpose motivated the Indiana Legislature in enacting the statute.
Id.
229. Justice Souter disagreed with this assertion. He suggested that while the State did use
the statute to target evil secondary effects of nude entertainment establishments, those effects
were not necessarily related to the expressive message of nude dancing. Id. at 2470-71. Justice
Souter's O'Brien analysis goes awry in this respect. There clearly is a causal connection between
nude dancing's message of eroticism and the evil secondary effects that concern the State. Addi-
NUDE DANCING
terest. By conceding that this was the justification for prohibiting nude
dancing, however, the State admitted that it targeted the expressive ac-
tivity precisely because of the message it communicated.2 30 Since the
State, by its own admission, targeted the expressive conduct, it must
satisfy the most exacting scrutiny.23 1 Even if the secondary effects of
nude entertainment establishments presented a compelling State inter-
est, there were less restrictive means of mitigating those effects.232
In sum, the Court's analysis of Indiana's prohibition of nude danc-
ing was flawed in several respects. The Court ignored Indiana's selective
prohibition of nude dancing because of the offensive nature of the danc-
ers' message it communicated. The Court misconstrued Indiana's inter-
est in applying its statute to prohibit nude striptease dancing and failed
to recognize less restrictive ways of furthering Indiana's interests. The
Court's faulty reasoning perhaps underscored its assessment of the ar-
tistic merits of nude dancing.
VI. SKIRTING THE ISSUE-SHOULD NUDE DANCING BE PROTECTED?
The Court in Barnes held that nude dancing implicated some mini-
mal First Amendment protection. By manipulating constitutional doc-
trine, however, the Court reached the same result as if nude dancing
were not protected by the First Amendment. Perhaps the Court felt
bound by its previous suggestions that nude dancing was protected ex-
pression and, thus, sought an alternative method to achieve its desired
result. This suggestion begs the question that so deeply divided the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals: Should nude dancing be protected
under the First Amendment?
An inquiry into the nature and history of dance suggests that
dance, like verbal communication, is inherently communicative con-
duct. Furthermore, even if nude dancing is not inherently expressive,
striptease dancing of the type found in Barnes is sufficiently communi-
cative to be afforded First Amendment protection.
tionally, as Justice White noted, if there was no causal connection between nude dancing's message
and its negative secondary effects, the State had no rational basis for its prohibition of nude danc-
ing. See supra note 160.
230. See supra note 206.
231. See supra note 182.
232. Justice White suggested that if the State desires to curb the evil secondary effects of
nude entertainment establishments, it could, for example, "require that, while performing, nude
performers remain at all times a certain minimum distance from spectators, that nude entertain-
ment be limited to certain hours, or even that establishments providing such entertainment be
dispersed throughout the city." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2475.
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A. Dance As Inherently Communicative
The distinction between speech and conduct is elusive. All speech
inextricably involves conduct, but not all conduct constitutes speech.33
Speech is a form of conduct.234 Communication is the element necessary
to carry conduct into the realm of protected speech.35 Communication
implies an actor and an audience.236 Whether a form of conduct is com-
municative largely depends on the intent of the actor and the presence
of an actual or potential audience.31
If a communicator intends to convey a message by her conduct to
an actual or potential audience, then such conduct ought to be pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Some forms of conduct are used inher-
ently for communicative purposes. Verbal speech is the quintessential
communicative conduct. The purpose of speech almost invariably is to
communicate. Speech evolved out of the need to communicate. 238
Other forms of conduct, like speech, are inherently communicative.
Written words are a form of inherently communicative conduct.239 In
Ward v. Rock Against Racism24° the Supreme Court recognized music
as another inherently communicative form of conduct. 241 Dance also is
an inherently communicative form of conduct.
242
233. See Kristin M. Burt, Note, Nude Entertainment as Protected Expression: A Federall
State Law Conflict After Crownover v. Musick, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211, 214 (1982).
234. See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1124 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech
Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 29 (1973).
235. See Nimmer, supra note 234, at 36.
236. See id.
237. The term "potential audience" refers to those persons who could receive the message,
but may or may not be willing to participate. Certain conduct, such as operating a jackhammer,
may convey a message to observers, but First Amendment protections do not apply if the actor did
not intend to communicate. See Nimmer, supra note 234, at 36. See also JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 16, 42 (1970). Similarly, an actor may intend to
communicate a message, but no communication, and thus no First Amendment protection, can
exist without an actual or potential audience. See Nimmer, supra note 234, at 36. Nimmer states
that "[t]he right to engage in ... conduct which no one can observe may sometimes qualify as a
due process 'liberty,' but without an actual or potential audience there can be no first amendment
speech right." Id.
238. See generally 28 ENCYCLOPOEDIA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA 85 (1990).
239. The First Amendment covers not only freedom of speech, but also freedom of the press.
See supra note 2. The Supreme Court has stated that a newspaper comment or a telegram is a
"pure form of expression." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 564 (1965).
240. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
241. The Court stated:
Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato's discourse in the
Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known its capacity to appeal
to the intellect and to the emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the
needs of the state.. . . The Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order.
Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
242. Dance has been defined as "the art of moving the body in a rhythmical way, usually to
266
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Dance may have been humanity's first method of communica-
tion.4 The earliest primitive dances probably were simple expressions
of pleasure or acts related to courtship.2 4 Much like speech or music,
dance has been used throughout history to appeal to the intellect and
the emotions. 245 To classify dance as conduct less communicative or less
deserving of First Amendment protection than speech, writing, or music
is sheer folly.
2 48
music, to express an emotion or idea, to narrate a story, or simply to take delight in the movement
itself." See 16 ENCYCLOPOEDIA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA 936 (1990). Judge Flaum wrote about
dance:
Inherently it is the communication of emotion or ideas. At the root of all "[t]he varied mani-
festations of dancing ... lies the common impulse to resort to movement to externalise states
which we cannot externalise by rational means. This is basic dance."
Miller, 904 F.2d at 1085 (quoting J. MARTIN, INTRODUCTION TO THE DANCF (1939)).
243. See 16 ENCYCLOPOEDIA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA 935-36 (1990). There is evidence,
throughout recorded history, of humans dancing. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id. Biblical passages make reference to dance as a form of expressing happiness and
praise. See, e.g., Psalms 149:3 ("let them praise his name with dancing, making melody to him
with timbre and lire!"); Psalms 150:4 ("Praise him with timbrel and dance ...").
An excerpt from Judge Posner's concurrence in Miller provides a helpful perspective on the
eroticism in dance. It states:
Public performances of erotic dances d6buted in Western culture in the satyr plays of the
ancient Greeks, were suppressed by Christianity, and, with Christianity's grip loosening, reap-
peared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They reappeared in a variety of
forms: as the can-can and the music-hall chorus line, from which the Folies Berg~re and its
tame American counterparts-the Ziegfeld Follies, and more recently the Radio City Music
Hall Rockettes and the chorus lines in Broadway and Hollywood musicals-descend. As the
Dance of the Seven Veils in Richard Strauss's opera Salome (1905), from which the fan danc-
ing of Sally Rand and the decorous striptease of Gypsy Rose Lee, or of Gwen Verdon in the
musical comedy Damn Yankees, may be said to descend. Ballet was nothing new in the nine-
teenth century; but as the costumes of ballet dancers became scantier, the erotic element in
ballet became more pronounced, reaching scandalous proportions in Diaghilev's L'apres midi
d'un faune (1912) (an example, and not an isolated one, of male erotic dancing) and becoming
a staple of distinguished companies like the New York City Ballet and the American Ballet
Theater. "Modern dance," a ballet offshoot pioneered by, among others, the erotic dancer
Isadora Duncan, has long been partial to nudity. Examples of erotic dance in non-Western
cultures include not only belly dancing but also the overtly erotic nude dancing of Les Ballets
Africains de Keita Fodeba, which, but for its exoticism, would be considered shockingly
explicit.
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089-90 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
246. See Been, supra note 29, at 13. Been states that "[t]he first amendment 'market place
of ideas' cannot be limited to those items which are solely intellectual in content. Although dance
has historically been a mode of expression which is more emotive than cognitive, this distinction
does not lessen its protection under the Constitution." Id.
In City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), the Supreme Court refused to recognize
recreational ballroom dancing as expressive activity. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "[iut is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-for exam-
ple, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at the shopping mall-but such a kernel is
not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment." Id. at 25. The
issue in Stanglin was whether recreational dancing was protected under the First Amendment
right to association. Id. The Court concluded that recreational ballroom dancing was neither a
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The fact that dance is inherently communicative remains regard-
less of the presence of nudity. The presence of nudity alone does not
place otherwise protected activity outside the mantle of First Amend-
ment protection.2 1 Thus, any attempt to distinguish modern dance or
ballet from striptease or go-go dancing necessarily fails.248
Nude dancing may be offensive and displeasing. As with any other
method of communication, its artistic or aesthetic value will depend
largely on the communicator. 24 Regardless of the tastefulness of a par-
ticular performance, the nonobscene striptease dancer is utilizing a me-
dium that is inherently communicative and deserves First Amendment
protection.
B. The Texas v. Johnson Test
In 1974 the Supreme Court ruled in Spence v. Washington5 0 that
a student's conduct of taping a peace symbol to a United States flag
and hanging it out of a window was protected by the First Amendment.
The Court held that the student intended to convey a particularized
form of intimate association nor a form of expressive association. Id. at 23-25.
The activity in Stanglin differs greatly from the nude dancing at issue in Barnes. In Stanglin
the respondent owned a roller-skating rink in which some persons would dance recreationally while
others would skate. Id. at 22. Thus, in Stanglin there was no intent to perform, no performance,
and no audience. With nude dancing, it is possible to have an intent to perform, a performance,
and a receptive audience.
247. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981).
Concerning the Indiana Supreme Court's conclusion, in State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580
(1979), that nude dance was not protected expression, Professor Jeffrey Been stated:
Such a proscription ... misperceives the nature of the act. As with a dramatic work or musi-
cal score which attempts to convey an emotive message, the costume, the actor, the set, the
consonance and dissonance cannot be separated from the act. All combine to produce emotive
expression. No clear distinction can be drawn between that act which is merely conduct in the
performance and that which is protected expression.
Been, supra note 29, at 13.
248. In Miller Judge Easterbrook tried to distinguish nude dance from music or ballet by
suggesting that music appeals to the intellect and ballet tells stories. 904 F.2d 1081, 1125 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook later concluded that "[b]arroom displays
are to ballet as white noise is to music." Id. at 1126.
In their brief before the Supreme Court, the Barnes petitioners similarly argued that
"[a]rtistic conduct such as ballet communicates an artistic message (regardless of whether it is bad
art or good art) which distinguishes it from the aimless wanderings of nude barroom dancers."
Brief for Petitioners at 10, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (No. 90-26).
Not all music, however, appeals to every intellect, and the stories of a ballet are not always
clear. See Miller, 904 F.2d at 1086. Also, striptease dances are sometimes choreographed to tell a
particular story or to portray a particular incident. Even though most striptease dances cannot
boast such careful planning, Judge Easterbrook's distinction is faulty because improvisational
dance, as much as improvisational speech or music, still maintains its communicative character.
249. In Miller Judge Flaum stated that "[w]hile the ideas communicated by a particular
dance may well vary according to the context in which it is performed, the communication of
expression clearly does not." 904 F.2d at 1086.
250. 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974).
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message and his message probably would be understood by those who
viewed it.2 51 Fifteen years later in Texas v. Johnson the Supreme Court
faced the issue of whether the burning of the American flag was simi-
larly expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.2 5 2 The
Court, quoting from Spence, articulated a two-part test for determining
when conduct should be afforded First Amendment protection. The
Court stated that the First Amendment would apply to conduct when
there was an intent to convey a particularized message and when the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
viewing it. 253 The Court concluded that the symbolic burning of the flag
was sufficiently communicative to implicate First Amendment
protection. 5'
In determining that nude dancing deserved First Amendment pro-
tection, the majority of the Seventh Circuit in Miller relied on the
Texas v. Johnson test.2 55 In light of the controversy over nude dancing,
two questions must be addressed: (1) should the Johnson test be ap-
plied to nude dancing?; and (2) if Johnson does apply, is nude dancing
sufficiently communicative to merit protection under the First
Amendment?
1. Is the Johnson Test Applicable to Nude Dancing?
The respondents in Barnes argued before the Supreme Court that
the test articulated in Texas v. Johnson did not apply to nude danc-
ing.25s According to the respondents, the Court only applied the John-
son test to pure conduct that was being performed in a context that
communicated a message.257 The Johnson test, therefore, should not
apply to an inherently expressive activity such as dance.258
In Johnson the Supreme Court mentioned several examples of con-
duct protected by the First Amendment. 259 The examples included the
wearing of black armbands, 26 0 a sit-in by blacks,26' the unofficial don-
ning of American military uniforms, 22 and picketing.26 Each of these
251. Id. at 410-11.
252. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
253. Id. at 404.
254. Id. at 406.
255. See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
256. See Brief of Respondent at 24-26, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1990)
(No. 90-26).
257. Id. at 25.
258. Id. at 25-26.
259. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
260. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
261. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
262. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
263. Food Employees v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1968); United States
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activities was inherently conduct. 64 Moreover, each type of conduct was
protected under the First Amendment only because of the surrounding
social and political context. Thus, the Johnson test determined under
what circumstances conduct, otherwise not communicative, was suffi-
ciently communicative to merit First Amendment protection.
Nude dancing is inherently communicative and should not be sub-
ject to a test typically applied to pure conduct. In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism,261 a case decided in the same year as Johnson, the
Court held that music was protected expression under the First Amend-
ment. The Court did not apply the Johnson test, but instead concluded
that music was protected as a form of expression and communication. 6
Dance, also a form of expression and communication, deserves the same
treatment.
2. Is Nude Striptease Dancing Sufficiently Communicative Under
the Johnson Test?
Assuming arguendo26' 7 that the Johnson test applies to nude danc-
ing, it must be determined whether the dancers intended to convey a
particularized message and whether the message would be understood
by those who viewed it.
2 s
If the message communicated by the dancers in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc. was one of sensuality and eroticism, those who paid to
view it probably comprehended it. 269 The question of the dancers' in-
tent, however, presents greater difficulty. If intent is read to mean ac-
tual, subjective intent, then nude dancing would be protected only
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983).
264. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405, where the Supreme Court stated:
We have not automatically concluded, however, that any action taken with respect to our
flag is expressive. Instead, in characterizing such action for First Amendment purposes, we
have considered the context in which it occurred. n Spence, for example, we emphasized that
Spence's taping of a peace sign to his flag was "roughly simultaneous with and concededly
triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy."...
*. . Johnson burned an American flag as part-indeed, as the culmination-of a political
demonstration that coincided with the convening of the Republican Party and its renomina-
tion of Ronald Reagan for President.. . . In these circumstances, Johnson's burning of the
flag was conduct "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication" • . to implicate the
First Amendment.
Id. at 405-06 (quoting from Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974)).
265. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
266. Id. at 790.
267. Part VI(B)(1) of this Recent Development concluded that the Johnson test is not ap-
propriate to conduct, such as dance, that is inherently communicative.
268. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
269. See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), in
which Judge Flaum suggested that "it is apparent that those who view the respective dances read-
ily comprehend the intended messages, for they advance currency to view them."
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when the dancer could establish that she had the requisite intent on a
particular occasion. Thus, a nude dance of the same variety and in the
same place could implicate First Amendment protection when done by
one dancer, but not. when done by another. Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc. demonstrated the problems created by this reading of the Johnson
test. For example, Gayle Sutro claimed to be an artist intending to
communicate as well as entertain.2 70 Darlene Miller, on the other hand,
stated that she simply danced for the money and so that the patrons
would buy her more drinks.2 71 Thus, under this reading of the Johnson
test, only Sutro's dancing would be protected expression. A more prac-
tical reading of the Johnson intent requirement would infer an intent
to communicate from the context in which the activity occurred. 2
The type of nude dancing at issue in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
occurs nightly in thousands of establishments across the country. While
the nude dancing in Barnes did not occur in the context of a political
controversy such as flag burning at the Republican National Conven-
tion or sit-ins during the Civil Rights movement, it would be unrealistic
to infer that nude dancers did not intend to communicate a message.
The dancers communicated messages of eroticism and sensuality, and
willing patrons received those messages. Thus, the nude dancing was
sufficiently communicative to implicate First Amendment protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Barnes decision reflected the Court's reluctance to treat nude
dancing as a legitimate form of expression. The Court's manipulation of
constitutional doctrine to uphold Indiana's prohibition of this unique
medium was the most significant and troublesome aspect of the Barnes
case. Nude dancing may not be a widely appreciated activity. Indeed, it
often is crude and displeasing. The role of the Court in analyzing state
laws prohibiting forms of expression, however, is not to assess the artis-
tic merits of the protected activity.2 7 3 Prohibition of this expressive, al-
270. See supra note 83.
271. Id.
272. This is, in fact, what the Supreme Court has done. See supra note 264.
273. Justice White stated:
The Court's assessment of the artistic merits of nude dancing performances should not be the
determining factor in deciding this case. In the words of Justice Harlan, "it is largely because
governmental officials cannot make principled decisions in this area that the Constitution
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 25 (1971). "[W]hile entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those
who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by judges) or in quality (as
viewed by critics), it may not differ in substance from the dance viewed by the person who
. . . wants some 'entertainment' with his beer or shot of rye." Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501
F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (CA2 1974), aff'd in part, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
Barnes at 2474-75 (White, J., dissenting).
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beit offensive, activity, therefore, deserved more honest scrutiny.
Zachary T. Fardon*
* The Author would like to thank Professor Thomas R. McCoy of the Vanderbilt University
School of Law for helpful suggestions about an earlier draft of this Recent Development.
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